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In the 19th century, during the passage of what would become the Bankruptcy Act 
1883, the objects of a good bankruptcy law were stated to be ‘the honest 
administration of bankrupt estates, with a view to the fair and speedy distribution 
of the assets’, ‘to improve the general tone of commercial morality, to promote 
honest trading, and to lessen the number of failures’ - more pithily summarised 
as being ‘to protect the salvage, and also to diminish the number of wrecks’.1 
However, in contrast to the continuing success of the 19th and early 20th century 
legislation governing solvent partnerships and LLPs,2 and despite a similar 
statement of aims in the Cork Report a hundred years later,3 the laws governing 
insolvent partnerships and LLPs today fail to achieve these tasks, not least 
because of the under-theorisation of those laws.  The root of the problem is that 
they are founded on legislation drafted for companies and individuals, and this is 
inappropriate, in theory and in practice, to partnerships and LLPs. The result is 
that partnership and LLP insolvency laws remain, as the law governing insolvent 
partnerships was noted to be in 1882, in a state “for which nobody has yet given 
an intelligible reason”.4 They consequently require substantial and wide-ranging 
reform to improve their transparency, omit or adapt inappropriate concepts, 
clarify decisionmaking procedures, and remove partnership winding up and 
partner disqualification from their ambit.  
 
1 Introduction 
The Insolvent Partnerships Order 19945 (IPO), which applies in England and 
Wales, is, as is widely acknowledged, a deeply flawed piece of legislation: the 
court in Official Receiver v Hollens6 described it as ‘very far from straightforward 
even for those familiar with insolvency law and practice’. Other commentators 
have described it as ‘an indigestible patchwork of provisions’,7 ‘a morass of 
referential drafting’,8 ‘hideously complicated’,9 ‘difficult to comprehend’,10 and ‘far 
from accessible’ so that it was ‘no wonder that the unrepresented bankrupt 
partners [in Hollens] were mystified by most of the proceedings’.11 The insolvency 
provisions of the Limited Liability Partnerships Regulations 200112 (LLP 
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1 Joseph Chamberlain MP, President of the Board of Trade, HC Deb 19 March 1883, vol 277, cols 816-
912.   
2 There are currently 413,000 partnerships (BEIS, ‘Business population estimates for the UK and 
regions 2017: detailed tables’, Table 3 <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/business-
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para 198.   
4 Sir Frederick Pollock, Essays in jurisprudence and ethics (Macmillan 1882) 100 p96. 
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12 SI 2001/1090.   
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Regulations), which apply throughout the UK, are, if not equally deficient, 
substantially so. Given this, the question that must be asked is what value, if 
any, they add.  In providing an answer, this article will distinguish between the 
value of those provisions designed to rescue the business as a going concern, and 
thus ‘diminish the number of wrecks’; and those designed to facilitate the break 
up of the business, and thus ‘protect the salvage’. It will argue that the rescue 
procedures - voluntary arrangements and administration (although administration 
is not solely a rescue procedure, rescue being only one of its three possible 
objectives13) - are worth retaining despite their flaws, because they have the 
potential to achieve a variety of valuable aims and because partnership law itself 
provides no alternatives.  In contrast, the unnecessary complexity and cost of the 
break up procedures - liquidation and joint partner bankruptcy - prevent them 
succeeding in their potential aims, and they should cease to apply to partnerships 
because better alternatives exist.  
 
The extent of the deficiencies is unsurprising when it is considered that the IPO 
and the LLP Regulations are based on laws designed not for partnerships or LLPs 
but for companies and individuals (principally the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986), 
the Insolvency (England and Wales) Rules 201614 (Insolvency Rules) and the 
Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 (CDDA 1986)), and that these laws 
themselves suffer from substantial defects which have been discussed at length 
elsewhere.15 These defects include lack of fairness (both as between the business 
and its creditors, and as between creditors), accountability (including failure to 
deter management incompetence or misconduct, and to incentivise creditors to 
monitor management), cost effectiveness and efficiency; and an overall lack of 
clarity in the conceptual underpinnings and the values pursued, including the 
balance to be struck between efficiency and fairness, and between rescue and 
asset distribution. So an already shaky legislative foundation has been used for 
business vehicles which are very different from those for which it was intended, 
without any thought having been given to whether this is appropriate or 
necessary for partnerships or LLPs at all. This raises the fundamental question of 
why company procedures should be applied to partnerships or LLPs, given that 
these are very different vehicles. It is true that LLP members have limited 
liability16 and in that respect are akin to companies but, as this article will 
demonstrate, many of the underlying principles and much of the practical detail 
of the legislation are inappropriate to both partnerships and LLPs or unnecessary. 
This parallels the problem of small private companies having to ‘suffer’ regulation 
designed for large public companies;17 but the distinctions between partnerships 
or LLPs, and companies, or individuals, are even greater than those between 
private and public companies.   
 
First, partnerships and LLPs are defined as two or more persons carrying on 
business together with a view of profit.18 Thus partners and LLP members both 
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15 See, for example, Vanessa Finch and David Milman “Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles” 
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the Enterprise Act 2002’ (2008) 5(2) ECFR 148, Vanessa Finch, ‘The Recasting of Insolvency Law’ 
(2005) 68(5) MLR 713, Adrian Walters, ‘Personal Insolvency law after the Enterprise Act: an Appraisal’ 
(2005) 5(1) JCLS 65, Justice, ‘Insolvency law: An agenda for reform’ (1994) Ch 7 and David Milman, 
‘Insolvency Act 1986: how not to legislate’ (1986) 7(5) Comp Law 178. 
16 Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2000, s1(4). 
17 The Company Law Review Steering Group, ‘Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy’ at x. 
18 Partnership Act, s 1(1) and the Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2000, s 2(1).   
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own and manage the business and their roles therefore differ fundamentally from 
those of company directors or members as enshrined in law (although not 
necessarily in practice in instances where a small company is owned and run by 
the same person or few people). This is reflected in their different decisionmaking 
processes, based on one vote per person in a single tier of decisionmaking, and 
significant problems are caused by the failure of the insolvency legislation to 
recognise this difference, as discussed below.  (Ironically, Scottish partnerships, 
which do have separate personality, 19 are dealt with under (Scottish) bankruptcy 
legislation (see further below). 
 
Second, unlike companies or individuals, partnerships are not entities but 
aggregates. Unfortunately, although ‘[a]n English partnership does not have 
separate legal personality….insolvency law treats it to some extent as if it did’20 
and the application to a partnership of terminology and concepts designed for an 
entity is therefore often confusing or indeed meaningless, which causes 
substantial problems.  
 
Third, partners, unlike company members, are personally liable for the debts of 
the business.21 This necessitates a very different approach to matters such as the 
priority of debts and sanctions in the event of wrongdoing. It also means that an 
individual partner’s finances and solvency cannot be viewed in isolation from 
those of his co-partners, and yet the IPO often does exactly that, because of its 
foundation on legislation designed for companies or individuals. This again 
parallels corporate problems, because insolvency law fails to enable assets and 
liabilities of an ‘enterprise group’ – two or more legal entities linked together by 
some form of control or ownership22 - to be consolidated while respecting the 
rights of separate creditors,23 and thus ‘singularly fail[s] to accommodate… the 
management of enterprise groups’.24 
 
These significant differences lead to manifold practical and legal problems, which 
are discussed below. However, as this article will demonstrate, they also mean 
that the theories developed to underpin insolvency law do not fit well with the 
realities of partnerships or even LLPs, because those theories have been 
developed for companies (and, to the limited extent that they consider 
individuals,25 have focused on consumers rather than entrepreneurs26), and 
partnership- or LLP-specific theories have not been developed. The result is that 
partnership and LLP insolvency legislation is under-theorised. 
 
This article will therefore first examine the company insolvency theories and their 
implications for partnership and LLP insolvency law. It will then analyse the 
defects in the legislation which result from the failure to recognise the significant 
differences between partnerships and LLPs as compared to companies, and from 
the consequent under-theorisation of the legislation. Some of these defects 
                                                        
19 Partnership Act 1890, s4(2). 
20 Hamish Anderson, ‘Insolvency Focus’ (1994) 91(18) LSGaz 7 December 1994.  
21 Partnership Act, s9  
22 UNCITRAL Working Group V (Insolvency Law), ‘Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (2010) 
A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.92 para 2.  
23 Henry Peter, ‘Insolvency in a Group of Companies, Substantive and Procedural Consolidation: When 
and How?’, Ch 17 in Henry Peter, Nicolas Jeandin and Jason Kilborn (eds), The Challenges of Insolvency 
Law Reform in the 21st Century (2006, Schulthess) and Stephen J Taylor, ‘Practical Difficulties in 
Handling Group Insolvencies’, Ch 22 in Peter et al, ibid.  
24 Roy Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (4th edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2011) para 1-28.   
25 For example, Milman 2005 n9.   
26 See, for example, Johanna Niemi, Iain Ramsay and William C Whitford, Consumer Credit, Debt and 
Bankruptcy: Comparative and International Perspectives (2009, Hart) and Joseph Spooner, ‘Seeking 
Shelter in Personal Insolvency Law: Recession, Eviction and Bankruptcy’s Social Safety Net’ (2017) 
44(3) J Law & Soc 374.   
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pervade the legislation while others are specific to particular procedures, but for 
each this article will assess what, if any, improvements could be made to render 
the legislation effective. Next, it will consider what properly theorised and 
justified partnership and LLP insolvency laws would look like, and how they could 
be achieved in practice. Finally, a conclusion will be drawn as to how 
policymakers and the legislature should respond in order to ensure that 
partnerships and LLPs are provided with the necessary legislative support while 
unnecessary and often counterproductive regulation is removed.  
 
2) Applying company insolvency theories to partnerships and LLPs 
As this section will demonstrate, it is difficult to apply company insolvency 
theories to partnerships or even LLPs; and to the extent that they can be applied, 
they dictate different outcomes, in the form of different insolvency laws to those 
currently enacted. In particular, although they may justify the availability of 
procedures designed to preserve the business as going concern, they do not 
justify the detail of those procedures and, further, may render redundant the 
procedures for the break-up of a business which cannot be rescued and the 
application of the disqualification regime. A detailed account of these theories is 
beyond the scope of this article, and in the interests of brevity the following 
discussion draws substantially on both Finch’s summary of the theories, and that 
of Keay and Walton.27  
 
One of the most influential company insolvency law theories is that of creditors’ 
wealth maximisation, which suggests that insolvency law should ensure that the 
return to creditors is maximised.28 However, in the context of insolvent 
partnerships, this theory is essentially irrelevant because the automatic 
availability to partnership creditors of partners’ personal assets implements the 
theory of creditors’ wealth maximisation without any need to invoke insolvency 
law at all.  To some extent, the personal liability imposed by partnership law 
(although not LLP law) also implements the hypothetical creditors’ bargain 
version of this theory, whereby creditors are to be put in the position that they 
would have bargained for with the debtor had they done so before entering into 
the transaction with him;29 although it can be argued that where a firm is 
insolvent despite the personal liability of its partners, insolvency procedures may 
be needed to protect creditors generally against ad hoc recovery by particular 
creditors from partnership or personal assets.  
 
Alternative theories which reflect the fact that there are other stakeholders in the 
business, such as employees and those who benefit from goods or services supplied 
by the firm or from the spending power of its employees, are also problematic.30 
This is because they can only with difficulty be adapted to reflect the fact that 
partners and LLP members themselves (and thus their families) are significant 
stakeholders because of their capital contributions and, in the case of partners, 
personal liability, and their role as managers and workers in the business. Thus, 
                                                        
27 Vanessa Finch, ‘The Measures of Insolvency Law’ (1997) 17(2) OJLS 227, 230-234 (substantially 
reproduced in Vanessa Finch and David Milman, Corporate Insolvency Law: Principles and Practice (3rd 
edn, CUP 2017) pp28-41) and Andrew Keay and Peter Walton, Insolvency Law: Corporate and Personal 
(4th edn, Jordans, 2017) 24-30.  
28 Thomas E Jackson, ‘Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors’ Bargain’ (1982) 
91(5) Yale LJ 857 and Goode n24 para 2-15; see further Finch n27 230-234 and Keay and Peter Walton 
n27 25-36.  
29 Jackson n28, Thomas E Jackson and Robert E Scott, ‘On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on 
Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditor’s Bargain’ (1989) 75(2) Va L Rev 155 and Rizwaan Jameel 
Mokal, Corporate Insolvency Law: Theory and Application (OUP 2005), Ch 2; see further Finch 1997 
n27, 230-234 and Keay and Walton n27, 25-26.  
30 Karen Gross, Taking Community Interests into Account in Bankruptcy: An Essay (1994) 72(3) Wash 
ULQ 1031 and Donald Korobkin, ‘Rehabilitating Values: a Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy’ (1991) 91 Colum 
L Rev 717.  
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neither the contractarian approach which examines the bargain which a range of 
stakeholders would reach pre-insolvency,31 nor the communitarian theory which 
suggests the redistribution of assets according to the interests of these 
stakeholders,32 are appropriate to determine the content of insolvency law on the 
breaking up of partnerships or LLPs.  Nonetheless, they do support the availability 
of rescue procedures, as do critiques of the creditor wealth maximisation theory.  
These value preserving the business as a going concern rather than breaking it up 
for creditors, in order to protect other stakeholders given that debts are intended 
to be repaid from income not capital and it is not normally the assets alone that 
produce income but the business as a whole, including its personnel and network 
of relationships.33  The forum theory, which suggests that the aim of insolvency 
law is simply to provide a forum for the airing of all interests,34 also has less 
application to partnerships or LLPs, in which management and ownership are 
already combined, and in particular to partnerships given partners’ personal 
liability. The ethical theory, which takes into account the situations of the debtor 
and the creditor, and the moral worthiness of the debt,35 is also much less relevant 
given partners’ personal liability and the risk to partners’ and LLP members’ capital 
and livelihoods. The ethical theory has also been criticised more generally as 
lacking both legal certainty and justification as to why ethics should determine the 
content of insolvency law when they do not underpin other areas of law.36   
 
A multiple values approach combining several rationales37 - for example the Cork 
Report’s statement of aims38 - is the most attractive, although the relative 
weighting of these values can be problematic and will differ for partnerships or 
LLPs as compare to companies or individuals. These aims include early diagnosis 
and treatment of insolvency; protection of the insolvent, creditors and other 
stakeholders; prevention of conflicts between creditors; efficient realisation and 
honest and fair distribution of the assets; protection of viable businesses; 
ascertaining the causes of the insolvency, with punishment where justified – in 
other words, protecting the salvage and diminishing the number of wrecks. They 
also include, as the Cork Report39 acknowledged in the insolvency context, and 
the DTI40 and the Company Law Review Steering Group41 (CLRSG) concluded in 
the wider corporate context, commanding universal respect and observance and 
achieving a system that is ‘simple and easily understood’, ‘free from anomalies 
and inconsistencies’ and ‘capable of being administered efficiently and 
economically’. Unfortunately, as this article will demonstrate, the laws governing 
insolvent partnerships and LLPs fail to achieve these aims. 
 
In assessing the success of the IPO and the LLP Regulations in fulfilling these 
multiple aims, it is unfortunately not possible to consider the take-up levels of 
any of the insolvency procedures by partnerships or LLPs because, predictably, 
figures are not available for them. Bankruptcy statistics do not distinguish 
between the joint bankruptcy of partners and other bankruptcies, statistics on 
partnership and LLP winding up are included within the company statistics, as are 
                                                        
31 Donald Korobkin, ‘Contractarianism and the Normative Foundations of Bankruptcy Law’ (1993) 71 
Texas L Rev 541; see further Finch 1997 n27, 234-236.   
32 Elizabeth Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policy’ (1987) 54(3) U Chi L Rev 775 and Gross n30; see further 
Finch 1997 n27 239-238 and Keay and Walton n27 27-28.   
33 Finch 1997 n27 231-234.   
34 Korobkin 1991 n30 772. 
35 Philip Shuchman, ‘An Attempt at a “Philosophy or Bankruptcy”’ (1973) 21 UCLA L Rev 403; see 
further Finch 1997 n27 230-234 and Keay and Walton n27 29-30.   
36 Finch 1997 n27 239-240.   
37 Finch 1997 n27 240 and Keay and Walton n27 28-29. 
38 n3 para 198.   
39 n3 para 198.   
40 DTI, ‘Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Consultation Paper’ (March 1998). 
41 n17 at xi and paras 1.15-1.22. 
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statistics on LLP voluntary arrangements (LLPVAs) and LLP administrations, and 
no statistics at all are kept on partnership voluntary arrangements (PVAs) or 
partnership administrations.  
 
3 Pervasive problems 
a) The legislation lacks transparency and thus accessibility 
The insolvency legislation applicable to partnerships and LLPs is so lacking in 
transparency - in the sense of being comprehensible to businesses and their 
professional advisors - that the likelihood of it being used at all, and thus of it 
achieving any of its aims, is seriously compromised. To the extent that it is used 
at all, the lack of transparency will increase inefficiency and cost, and hamper the 
protection of viable businesses and the achievement of fairness to creditors, 
partners or LLP members, and other stakeholders. This is particularly ironic given 
the aims of the Cork Report and the CLRSG discussed above.  
 
Difficulties are caused, first, by the form of the legislation.  It is not clear why the 
legislature chose to apply IA 198642 by order to insolvent partnerships, rather 
than to include a codified partnership chapter within IA 1986, or provide a fully 
standalone option; or why, when LLPs were introduced, it chose to apply IA 1986 
to them similarly through the LLP Regulations.43  
 
Although the IPO sets out in full those provisions of IA 1986 and CDDA 1986 
which it specifically modifies, it does not set out the many provisions which it 
applies without modification (other than generic modifications of terminology) 
and it is therefore necessary to constantly cross refer to IA 1986 or CDDA 1986, 
as well as to the Insolvency Rules. Further, the two IPO winding up procedures 
which involve partner bankruptcy concurrently with partnership winding up 
require cross-references to be made both to the corporate winding up provisions 
of IA 1986 on which partnership (and corporate partner) winding up are based, 
and to the bankruptcy provisions on which individual partner bankruptcy is based.  
 
Extensive internal cross-referencing within the IPO is also required: as the court 
in Official Receiver v Hollens44 noted,  
 ‘Understanding how the scheme works is not assisted by its mode of 
presentation, namely a series of articles each applying and, by reference to 
separate Schedules, modifying various provisions of the 1986 Act. The 
process of understanding is made more difficult by the fact that some of the 
articles provide for modifications to the 1986 Act by reference to 
modifications introduced by other articles so that it requires much cross- 
referencing and, at a practical level, much thumbing through the pages of 
the 1994 Order to establish just what the schedule of modifications is which 
is to apply to the particular insolvency proceedings.’ 
 
To add to the confusion, there is no consistency across the seven different 
partnership insolvency procedures45 as to whether and how a particular provision 
of IA 1986 is specifically modified, applied without modification (other than 
terminology), or not applied at all.  This is particularly confusing where the same 
winding up provisions are applied differently to partnerships and corporate 
partners, and where the same bankruptcy provisions are applied differently to 
partners jointly and partners concurrently with partnership winding up.  
 
                                                        
42 IA 1986, s420.  
43 LLP Regulations, Reg 5 and Sch 3.  
44 n6 para 29.  
45 Voluntary arrangements, administration, winding up by creditors or partners and with or without 
concurrent partner insolvency petitions, and joint partner bankruptcy.  
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Further, although the LLP Regulations modify IA 1986 and CDDA 1986 much less 
radically than does the IPO, they are even less transparent because they do not 
set out modified sections in full, but only list inserted or deleted words, and the 
numbers of omitted sections, so constant cross references have to be made.  
 
A second source of difficulty, which again begs the question why the IPO and the 
insolvency provisions of the LLP Regulations were adopted in preference to 
separate codified chapters in IA 1986 or fully standalone options, is the 
separation and subordination of the insolvent partnership and LLP legislation to IA 
1986 and CDDA 1986. This means that when that primary legislation is amended 
– for example by the Small Business and Employment Act 2015 (SBEEA) - it is 
rarely made clear how and when, or indeed if, such amendments apply to 
partnerships or LLPs.  Thus, where the IPO or the LLP Regulations apply the 
primary legislation without modification, changes to that primary legislation 
automatically apply to partnerships or LLPs without any consideration having 
been given to whether those changes are appropriate. Equally, where the IPO 
sets out a modified provision of the primary legislation, changes to the underlying 
primary legislation will (presumably) not apply, again without any consideration 
as to whether this is appropriate. And although the LLP Regulations merely 
explain modifications, there is no guarantee that the modification as applied to 
the new primary provision will make sense. Thus, firms face a lack of clarity long 
after the primary provisions for companies or individuals have been enacted, and 
risk being subject to a nonsensical mix of original and updated IA 1986 and CDDA 
1986 provisions. For example, when the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 
2013 (ERRA) reformed the IA 1986 bankruptcy provisions, to allow debtors to 
initiate their bankruptcy by applying to an adjudicator rather than the court, it 
failed to clarify whether these reforms apply to partnerships. Although it might 
have been assumed that, in the absence of an express legislative carve-out, 
reforms to debtor-initiated bankruptcy would apply to the two IPO procedures 
which involve partner-initiated partner bankruptcy (joint bankruptcy, and 
individual bankruptcy concurrently with partnership winding up on a partners’ 
petition), the Insolvency Service has confirmed that neither will become subject 
to the new adjudication regime.46  
 
A related problem is that where the IPO or the LLP Regulations apply whole Parts 
or ranges of sections of the primary legislation, it is not clear whether this 
automatically applies any new section inserted into such Parts or ranges in the 
primary legislation (or removes any section deleted).  For example, although Art 
16 IPO applies ss6–10 CDDA 1986 to partnerships, it was enacted prior to the 
insertion by the Enterprise Act 2002 of ss9A–9E47 and by the SBEEA of ss8ZA-
8ZE48 and so it remained unclear until the enactment of amendments to the IPO 
in 2017,49 whether partners could be disqualified in these circumstances.50  Even 
then, although the IPO was amended to expressly include modified versions of 
ss8ZA-8ZE, the amendments only confirm obliquely, by re-enacting the reference 
to ss6-10, that ss9A-9E apply (unmodified) to partnerships. 
 
As a result, partnership and LLP insolvency legislation lacks transparency, 
simplicity or clarity, and thus lacks accessibility.51  
 
b) Company terminology and concepts are not transposed effectively 
                                                        
46 Confirmed by the Insolvency Service in a letter to the author dated 12 September 2014.   
47 Disqualification for competition infringements. 
48 Disqualification of persons who exercise influence over a disqualified person. 
49 Insolvency (Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations 2017, SI 2017/1119.   
50 Berry and Parry n10 para 10.1.6. 
51 See further Elspeth Deards [Elspeth Berry], ‘Partnerships: when the view is no longer of profit’ 
(1995) 4(2) Nott LJ 165.   
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The lack of legislative transparency is exacerbated by the pervasive failure 
throughout the IPO and, to a lesser extent, the LLP Regulations, to appropriately 
adapt IA 1986 and CDDA 1986 terminology and concepts to partnerships and 
LLPs, with the result that it is often unclear how (or indeed if) particular 
provisions apply.  This impedes the potential effectiveness of the insolvency 
procedures and their ability to protect viability businesses and achieve fairness 
for all concerned. It creates substantive difficulties for firms, their creditors, and 
their insolvency practitioner (IP) in determining if, when, and how the insolvency 
procedures can be invoked, how the partners or members, creditors, or IPs 
should proceed and, ultimately, what the results will be for all concerned.  
 
For example, although the IPO defines a member of a partnership as including 
both partners (i.e. persons carrying on business in common with each other with 
a view of profit52) and persons held out as partners (i.e. persons who represent 
themselves or allow themselves to be represented as a partner and who are 
consequently personally liable to third parties who have relied on the 
representation53) (together referred to in this article as ‘partners’ in order to 
avoid confusion with LLP members),54 it does not define the term ‘director’. Art 3 
IPO provides that expressions appropriate to companies are to be construed as 
references to the corresponding persons appropriate to a partnership, which 
presumably includes partners since they carry on the business55 and have the 
right (in default of contrary agreement) to manage it,56 but it is unclear whether 
it includes persons held out as partners since, by definition, they are not partners 
and are thus unlikely to have a management role analogous to directors 
(including shadow57 or de facto directors58).  It is therefore impossible for those 
held out as partners to be certain of their responsibilities and liabilities in an 
insolvency.    
 
A related problem is caused by the IPO’s definition of an ‘officer’ of a partnership 
not only as a ‘member’ of it (defined as above) but also as any person who has 
management or control of its business.59 Thus it can include those who are 
neither partners nor held out as such, and this extension of the burdens imposed 
by IA 1986 beyond those persons normally encompassed by partnership law is 
both unnecessary and, given that the definition of an officer of an LLP is restricted 
to LLP members,60 unfair.  
 
Similarly, it is impossible for those who might be regarded as LLP members for 
the purposes of insolvency legislation to accurately predict or ascertain their 
rights, duties and liabilities in an insolvency, because the LLP Regulations do not 
define ‘members’.  It might be assumed that the term includes anyone registered 
as a member, but the Supreme Court in Clyde & Co LLP and another v Bates van 
Winkelhof held that registered ‘members’ who are in fact employees cannot in law 
be members,61 while recent tax changes have resulted in some registered 
members being treated as employees for tax purposes,62 and in Polegoshko and 
                                                        
52 Partnership Act, s1.  
53 Partnership Act, s14.  
54 IPO, Art 2.  
55 Partnership Act, s1.  
56 Partnership Act, s24(5).  
57 Insolvency Act, s252. 
58 Re Hydrodam (Corby) Ltd [1994] 2 BCLC 180, 183 and Holland v Commissioners for HMRC and 
another [2010] UKSC 51, [2010] 1 WLR 2793. 
59 IPO, art 2.   
60 LLP Regulations, Reg 4(1)(g).   
61 [2014] UKSC 32, [2014] 1 WLR 2047.   
62 Finance Act 2014, s 74 and Sch 17, Pt I.   
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others v Ibragimov and others63 the court ordered rectification of the register of 
LLP members on the grounds that it did not reflect the reality of the ownership of 
the LLP.  
 
The term ‘contributory’ is also problematic. In relation to partnerships, it is both 
redundant and a source of confusion. It is redundant because the ‘corresponding 
persons’ provision in Art 3 IPO means that contributories are likely to be the 
same as those who would, in any event, incur personal liability to partnership 
creditors as a matter of partnership law.64 It is confusing because this is not 
clearly stated, and indeed both of the IA 1986 definitions (for unregistered 
companies, which is how partnerships are treated for the purposes of winding up 
under the IPO, and for registered companies) are applied.65 Further, although the 
IPO provides that a partner against whom an insolvency order has been made 
concurrently with a winding up petition against the partnership is not to be 
treated as a contributory unless the contrary intention appears,66 it is not clear 
what would indicate ‘contrary intention’ in these circumstances or what the 
impact of this would be since the effect of partnership law is that a partner’s 
personal assets are automatically available to the partnership creditors. This 
unnecessary confusion could be avoided by stating in the IPO that references to 
contributories are omitted.  
 
The term contributory is also problematic in relation to LLPs. Sections 74 and 79 
of IA 1986 are modified so that a contributory is defined as every present or past 
LLP member who is liable to contribute to its assets on winding-up, and they are 
liable to do so if they have so agreed.67 However, it would be unusual for an LLP 
member to enter into such an agreement and, furthermore, a past member will 
only be liable if the obligations arising from such an agreement survive his 
departure from the LLP.68 It is therefore entirely possible that there will be no 
contributories to a particular LLP;69 and the scope for unnecessary concern on the 
part of LLP members, and confusion on the part of the IP or creditors would be 
reduced, if the LLP Regulations instead defined a contributory as a current or 
former LLP member who has agreed to make a contribution on winding up or any 
other contribution which remains unpaid. 
 
c) Internal decisionmaking procedures are uncertain 
A third pervasive problem throughout both the IPO and the LLP Regulations is 
that although the insolvency procedures adopted from IA 1986 variously require 
the partners, the LLP, or the LLP members, to take decisions about whether to 
invoke a procedure in the first place, and how and when to exercise the choices 
to be made subsequently, the IPO and the LLP Regulations frequently fail to 
specify how such decisions are to be taken. This again reduces the potential 
efficiency of the procedures and thus their ability to protect viable businesses or 
achieve fairness for creditors, partners or LLP members, and other stakeholders. 
 
                                                        
63 [2015] EWHC 1669 (Ch), [2015] All ER (D) 273 (Jun).   
64 I.e. general partners (Partnership Act, s 9) and those liable as such under s14 of the Partnership 
Act, former general partners to the extent of debts or obligations incurred while they were partners 
(Partnership Act, s 17) and limited partners (except in a PFLP) to the extent of any withdrawn capital 
(Limited Partnerships Act, s 4(2)); see further Berry and Parry n10 para 1.4.6.  
65 IA 1986, s 226, as applied by the IPO, arts 7, 8 and 9, and s 221(5), as modified by the IPO Sch 6, 
para 4, and IA 1986, s79 as applied by IA 1986, s 221(5) as modified by the IPO, Sch 3, Pt I, para 
3/Sch 4, Pt I, para 3/Sch 5, para 2/Sch 6, para 4.  
66 IA 1986, s221(2), as modified by the IPO, Sch 4, Part 1, para 3 and Sch 6, para 4.   
67 IA 1986, ss 74 and 79, as modified by the LLP Regulations, Sch 3.  
68 John Whittaker and John Machell, The Law of Limited Liability Partnerships (4th edn, 2016 
Bloomsbury) 31.21.   
69 Berry and Parry n10 para 1.4.6.   
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Where the legislation requires decisions to be taken by ‘the members’ of a 
partnership or LLP, or by ‘the LLP’, decisionmaking by a single partner or LLP 
member is evidently precluded,70 but it is unclear whether unanimity is required 
or whether a majority (and what sort) is sufficient. Partnership and LLP law both 
provide that, subject to contrary agreement, ‘ordinary matters’ are decided by a 
majority but unanimity is required in order to admit a new partner or member or 
change the nature of the firm’s business.71  In so far as this distinguishes 
between day-to-day decisions and decisions that affect the firm more 
fundamentally, it could be argued that a decision to invoke insolvency 
proceedings in the first place is more likely to constitute the latter,72 but 
subsequent decisions are often administrative and ordinary, and ascribing a 
different meaning to the same term in different contexts would be confusing.   
 
Majority decisionmaking derives support from the fact that many of the 
corresponding decisions in company insolvency - for which the provisions were 
designed – are taken by the directors,73 who normally act by majority, while 
those taken by shareholders only require a majority (and often only a simple 
majority).74 The IPO itself enables a single partner to petition for winding up;75 
and the Partnership Act similarly enables a single partner automatically to 
dissolve the partnership in the absence of contrary agreement ,76 or to apply 
procedures for judicial dissolution,77 in both cases usually leading to winding up. 
The LLP Regulations envisage majority decisionmaking in respect of one 
insolvency-related decision, the sale of the LLP’s business or property, which they 
expressly state may proceed despite a member not voting in favour of the LLP’s 
decision.78 Whittaker and Machell79 argue that the common law rule applicable to 
decisionmaking by corporate bodies80 applies to LLPs, which are corporate 
bodies,81 by virtue of the provision in Reg 7 that the mutual rights and duties of 
the LLP and its members are determined by the Regulations ‘subject to the 
provisions of the general law and to the terms of any [LLP] agreement’. This rule 
would dictate that, in the absence of contrary agreement, a majority is sufficient, 
although it does not assist where the decision is required to be taken by the LLP 
members rather than the LLP.  
 
However, para 105 of Sch B1 to IA 1986, which allows directors to act by 
majority in relation to administration, is explicitly excluded from the application of 
Sch B1 to partnerships and LLPs,82 and in Patley Wood Farm LLP v Brake and 
another83 the court considered the fact that Parliament had chosen to make 
express provision for majority action by directors but not for partners supported 
the view that a majority would not suffice. This judgment and the legislative 
                                                        
70 By way of exception, a partners’ winding up petition may be brought by ‘any partner’, subject to the 
fulfillment of certain criteria (IA 1986, s 221A(1) and (2), as inserted by the IPO, Sch 5, para 2). 
71 Partnership Act, s 24 and the LLP Regulations, Reg 7.  
72 Morse n11 para 5.23, Lindley & Banks n7 paras 27-155 and notes 674 and 741, and Blackett-Ord 
and Haren n8 para 22.75.   
73 For example the proposal of a CVA (IA 1986, s 1).   
74 Insolvency Rules, rule 2.36 provides that unless there is contrary provision in a company’s articles, a 
resolution is to be regarded as passed if voted for by a simple majority of those members voting. 
75 IA 1986, s221A as modified by IPO Sch 5, para 2, and IA 1986 ss124 and 264 as modified by IPO 
Sch 6, para 2.  
76 Partnership Act, ss 26 and 32. 
77 Partnership Act, s35. 
78 IA 1986, s 111(2) as modified by the LLP Regulations, Sch 3. 
79 Whittaker and Machell n68 paras 17.12 and 17.15. See also Berry and Parry n10 para 7.3.1.  
80 Merchants of the Staple of England v Governors of the Bank of England (1887) 21 QBD 160 (CA) 
165 (Wills J). See also The York Tramways Company Limited v Willows (1881–82) LR 8 QBD 685 (CA) 
698 (Brett LJ) and Attorney General v Davy (1741) 2 Atkyns 212, 26 ER 531.  
81 Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2000, s1(2). 
82 IPO, Sch 2, para 39 and the LLP Regulations, Sch 3.    
83 [2016] EWHC 1688 (Ch), [2017] 1 WLR 343.  
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provisions on which it turned apply only to administration. However, it is not clear 
why, as a matter of principle, a different approach should be taken to 
administration, and it may be that unanimity is required in all cases where the 
legislation refers to decisionmaking by ‘the partners’ or by ‘the LLP’ (which is the 
term used in the LLP Regulations in relation to the decision to enter 
administration). This then raises the question of whether the choice of the term 
‘the LLP’ or ‘the LLP members’, used variously in the LLP Regulations in relation to 
decisionmaking, is intended to reflect a distinction between decisions requiring 
unanimity and those only requiring a majority, or whether the legislators simply 
overlooked the fact that LLPs do not have two tiers of decision-makers analogous 
to company directors and shareholders.  
 
Decisions required to be taken by a specified proportion of partners, LLP 
members, or contributories, by reference to their value or voting rights, raise 
equivalent difficulties. Rule 2.35 of the Insolvency Rules states that the value of a 
member for the purpose of voting is to be determined by reference to the number 
of votes conferred on him by the company's articles; and Art 3 IPO provides that 
expressions appropriate to companies are to be construed in relation to a 
partnership as references to the corresponding partnership documents, while Reg 
5(2)(e) of the LLP Regulations provides that references to the articles of a 
company shall include reference to the LLP agreement. Thus, if a partnership or 
LLP agreement lays down the voting entitlement of each partner or LLP member, 
this will determine their ‘value’ for the purposes of Rule 2.35. However, unlike 
companies, neither partnerships nor LLPs are legally required to have an 
agreement and, since neither can register any agreement which they do have, 
disputes frequently arise as to the content of the agreement. Further, any 
agreement is unlikely to give voting rights to those merely held out to third 
parties as partners – who are included in the definition of partner for IPO 
purposes - unless they are also salaried partners or similar, and thus regarded for 
internal partnership purposes as partners.  Equally, although contributories may 
include former partners or LLP members, it is unlikely that any agreement will 
make provision for their voting rights. In the absence of agreement, it may be 
that the default provisions under s24 of the Partnership Act or Reg 7 of the LLP 
Regulations for one vote per partner or LLP member apply.84  Alternatively, the 
reference to their ‘value’ may be taken as referring to their relative capital 
contributions, but this would be problematic because there is no legal 
requirement to contribute capital and, in the event of disagreement as to the 
amounts actually contributed, the default provisions in s24 or Reg 7 provide that 
partners or members share equally in the capital of the firm,85 which could result 
in them being taken to have interests of equal value for voting purposes. 
 
The incoherence of the existing framework means that the safest approach is for 
all decisions to be taken unanimously, but this is not always practicable. If there 
is an agreement which specifies the manner in which decisions under the 
insolvency legislation are to be taken, a court may uphold this - but it may 
instead prefer a particular interpretation of the insolvency legislation. Partners 
and LLP members therefore face uncertainly and the risk of their decisions being 
challenged. A more reliable solution would be for the IPO and the LLP Regulations 
to be amended to specify that a simple majority is sufficient but, consistently with 
partnership and LLP law, to specify also that this is subject to contrary agreement 
by the partners or members. 
 
4 Problems with particular insolvency procedures  
                                                        
84 Berry and Parry n10 para 3.7.   
85 Partnership Act, 24(1), and LLP Regulations, Reg 7(1).  
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In addition to the problems which, as discussed above, pervade the IPO and the 
LLP Regulations, there are further defects specific to particular insolvency 
procedures. These will now be examined.  
 
a) Rescue procedures are less effective than they should be 
Difficulties arise in relation to both of the IA 1986 rescue procedures as they 
apply to partnerships - PVAs and partnership administration (insofar as 
administration is a rescue procedure86) - because the provisions for companies 
have been applied without the modifications necessary to reflect the ways in 
which partnerships differ from companies. First, a PVA only applies to partnership 
assets and not to the separate assets of partners, and there is no formal 
procedure for linking a PVA with a partner’s own individual or company voluntary 
arrangement (IVA or CVA). This is a significant flaw because partners are jointly 
and severally liable for the debts of the partnership.87 It would be preferable for 
formally linked voluntary arrangements for partners to be available as this would 
improve the viability and efficiency of a PVA by enabling partners’ assets to be 
taken into account, so reducing costs and increasing both creditor protection and 
the likelihood of the business surviving. This would clearly be possible within the 
scheme of the IPO, and indeed it already allows for multiple winding up 
proceedings or bankruptcies to be linked. 
 
Second, an application for partnership administration may be granted by the 
court only on the ground that the partnership is unable to pay its debts88 and not, 
unlike a company or LLP, also on the ground that it is likely to become unable to 
pay its debts.  This is contrary to one of the aims set out in the Cork Report, the 
early diagnosis and treatment of insolvency.89 Although pre-emptive action could 
be argued to be less important for partnership creditors than for company or LLP 
creditors, since partnership creditors also have recourse to partners’ personal 
assets,90 it is correspondingly more important for partners themselves than for 
company or LLP members that when the business is in imminent danger of being 
unable to pay its debts, it can access assistance as soon as possible. The 
interests of employees, suppliers and other stakeholders also require the IPO to 
be amended to offer partnerships the earliest opportunity to enter administration. 
 
A third problem for partnerships, which could prevent administration succeeding 
in protecting the business as a going concern or protecting its creditors, is that 
the moratorium which applies during administration has two significant gaps. 
First, although the moratorium prevents judicial dissolution of the partnership91 
and thus consequent winding up under the Partnership Act, a dissenting partner 
can still sabotage an administration if the partnership is ‘at will’ (i.e. if the 
partners have not agreed a fixed duration) simply by giving notice of his 
departure to the other partners,92 which triggers dissolution and, potentially, 
winding up under the Partnership Act. This is because giving such notice is 
unlikely to constitute a ‘legal process’ which would be prohibited by the 
moratorium,93 or to constitute a ‘management power...which could be exercised 
so as to interfere with the exercise of the administrator’s powers’ which would be 
prohibited as an interference with the administrator’s functions unless he 
                                                        
86 IA 1986, Sch 2, para 3, applied without modification to both partnerships and LLPs by the IPO, art 6 
and the LLP Regulations, art 5.   
87 Partnership Act, s9 and Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978, s3.  
88 IA 1986, Sch B1, para 11 as modified by the IPO, Sch 2, para 5. 
89 n3 para 198.   
90 Deards [Berry] n51.   
91 IA 1986, Sch B1, para 42 as modified by the IPO, Sch 2, para 17.    
92 Partnership Act, s 26.   
93 IA 1986, Sch B1, para 43 as modified by the IPO Sch 2, para 18, and para 44.   
 13 
consented.94 Of course, from the partnership law perspective this is not 
problematic at all, because it is an established tenet of partnership law that a 
partner should be able to leave the partnership and realise his share of its assets 
at any time unless the partners have agreed to the contrary.95 However, a clear 
statement in the IPO is needed to highlight the fact that partnership law prevails 
over the application of company insolvency law in this respect. A second gap in 
the moratorium is that although it protects the partnership assets, partners’ 
personal liability means that their private assets may still be subject to 
proceedings by partnership creditors. This results from the failure of the 
legislature to acknowledge one of the defining differences between companies 
and partnerships (although not LLPs) - namely limited liability. It could be filled 
by individual partners utilising IVAs and corporate partners utilising CVAs or 
company administration, if a formal procedure for linking these procedures with 
partnership administration were to be included in the IPO. As noted above in 
relation to the equivalent gap in relation to PVAs, the addition of such a 
procedure would be consistent with the existing IPO procedures for linking 
insolvency procedures. 
 
b) Partner bankruptcy provisions lack clarity 
Unfortunately, the procedures which might be expected to ‘protect the salvage’ 
on the break-up of a business - bankruptcy and liquidation - are even more 
flawed than the rescue procedures.   
 
Starting first with bankruptcy, it has already been noted that individual insolvency 
is under-theorised compared to company insolvency and that the minimal 
literature focuses on consumers rather than entrepreneurs.96 The result is that 
partnership bankruptcy is under-theorised. Insofar as bankruptcy law is generally 
intended both to provide a cost efficient mechanism for the recovery of debts and 
to rehabilitate the debtor,97 its administrative costs are relatively high in 
general,98 and the rehabilitative potential of the two partnership bankruptcy 
procedures in particular - joint bankruptcy of all partners, and partner bankruptcy 
concurrently with partnership winding up – is automatically reduced because the 
IPO does not apply IA 1986 provisions on debt relief for bankrupts.99  In contrast, 
in Scotland both a partnership and its partners (although not LLPs or their 
members) can apply for debt relief because both partnerships and individual 
partners are dealt with under the personal insolvency legislation (discussed 
further below).100   
 
A further problem is that there is an inherent tension between the aim of 
consolidating proceedings so that the entirety of the property owned by the 
partners, whether personal property or partnership property, is administered 
jointly, and the need to separate the partnership estate and individual partner 
estates to accommodate the different priorities to achieve overall fairness in the 
                                                        
94 IA 1986, Sch B1, para 64. See further Elspeth Berry, ‘Limited partners behaving badly: insolvency 
procedures and other options for general partners when limited partner default’ (2009) 24(11) BJIBFL 
660.   
95 Partnership Act, ss26 and 32; see further Lindley & Banks n7 paras 9.01-9.05. 
96 See the sources noted at n13. 
97 Milman 2005 n9 3-5.   
98 Milman 2005 n9 140-141.   
99 IA 1986, Part VIIA 1986, which makes provision for debt relief orders is not applied by the IPO, Arts 
8, 10 or 11.  
100 Laura Borland, ‘Partnership insolvency: Scotland vs England and Wales’ The Gazette, 16 June 2015 
www.thegazette.co.uk/insolvency/content/100114 accessed 5 March 2018 and the Accountant in 
Bankruptcy, The Debt Arrangement Scheme (DAS) Debtor Information Booklet Business DAS paras 
1.1-1.2 
<https://www.dasscotland.gov.uk/sites/default/files/publications/DAS%20debtor%20booklet%20-
%20Business.pdf> accessed 5 March 2018. 
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payment of joint and separate debts.101 This has resulted in legislation which 
lacks clarity and accessibility and poses potentially serious difficulties in 
identifying the bankruptcy estate for the purposes of getting it in and distributing 
it correctly. The modified provisions of IA 1986 contained in the IPO refer 
separately to the property/estates of partners and those of the partnership;102 for 
example, once joint bankruptcy orders are made, a trustee is appointed of the 
partners’ estates and of the partnership.103  However, the IA 1986 sections which 
are applied without modification refer only to the debtor’s property/estate. Since 
the debtors are the partners, not the partnership, the partnership property/estate 
will not be covered by those unmodified sections unless the partners are treated 
as owning their shares of the partnership property.104  In a partnership winding 
up with concurrent partner bankruptcy this cannot be the case since partnership 
property is dealt with by the partnership winding up, but in a joint bankruptcy the 
position is less clear. The IPO’s own definition of a partner’s estate, which is the 
same for both procedures is confused.  It provides that a partner’s separate 
estate includes all property vested in him but excludes any property which he 
holds in trust for another.105  This seemingly excludes partnership property since 
it is owned by the partners as trustees for themselves beneficially,106 a partner 
having no entitlement to any specific assets but merely an interest in partnership 
property which can only be realised through an action for a partnership 
account.107 However, the same provision also excludes business and household 
property insofar as they are not partnership property,108 and the latter 
qualification is redundant if the partner’s estate excludes partnership property in 
any event.  The fact that the joint bankruptcy provisions in the IPO do not 
separately define the partnership estate might indicate that the partners’ 
separate estates are intended to include it, but the concurrent bankruptcy and 
winding up provisions also fail to separately define it even though that procedure 
requires it to be dealt with separately through partnership winding up.  In any 
event, both sets of provisions also refer to ‘partnership property’ and this is 
defined in the IPO (albeit by reference to the definition in ss20-21 of the 
Partnership Act which itself lacks clarity and has consistently given rise to 
disputes109). A possible solution would be to insert an additional provision in 
relation to joint bankruptcy only, stating clearly that the partners’ separate 
estates do not include the partnership estate but that it will be got in by the same 
trustee and according to the same bankruptcy provisions. This would enable 
differentiation when distributing the estates and provide consistency with the 
same provisions applicable to concurrent bankruptcy, while at the same time 
ensuring that no property is missed.  
 
A further example of the legislative mess and resulting practical problems caused 
by the failure to properly transpose the provisions designed for individual 
bankruptcy to joint partner bankruptcy, is provided by the grounds for annulment 
of bankruptcy orders. Three of the IA 1986 grounds are applied by the IPO to 
                                                        
101 IA 1986, so 328–328D, as modified by the IPO, Sch 7, para 21. See further Johan J Henning, ‘the 
dual priorities rule and the Insolvent Partnerships Order of 1994’ (2010) 31(5) Comp Law 131.   
102 For example, IA 1986, s 290(3) as modified by the IPO, Sch 7, para 9.    
103 IA s293 as modified by IPO, Sch 7, para 11.   
104 For example, IA 1986, s 286 on the appointment of an interim receiver in order to protect the 
bankrupt’s property.   
105 IA 1986, s 283 as modified by the IPO, Sch 4, Pt II, para 28 and Sch 7, para 7.   
106 Partnership Act, s 20. Land can only be ‘owned’ by a partnership through the mechanism of 
between two and four partners holding it on trust for all the partners (Law of Property Act 1925 and s 
34, the Trustees Act 1925, s 34).   
107 Popat v Shonchhatra [1997] 1 WLR 1367 (CA) 1372 (Nourse LJ).  See further Morse n11 paras 
6.03-6.11.   
108 IA 1986, s 283(2) as modified by the IPO, Sch 7, para 7.   
109 For example, Miles v Clarke [1953] 1 All ER 779 (Ch), Robinson v Ashton (1875) 20 Eq 25 and 
Waterer v Waterer (1873) LR 15 Eq 402 (Ch).   
 15 
joint bankruptcy110 but the fourth, annulment because of the existence of an IVA, 
is not.111 It is not clear whether this was omitted intentionally – a possibility 
supported by the fact that the IPO also makes no provision for annulment where 
a PVA is in place - or whether the omission of both is an error – a possibility 
supported by the fact that such omissions would seem to defeat the aim of the 
insolvency legislation to facilitate voluntary arrangements. The latter argument 
might persuade a court to annul a joint bankruptcy order where an IVA or PVA is 
in place, but it is clearly unsatisfactory that partners, creditors and IPs cannot be 
certain which procedure will prevail. 
 
c) Winding up provisions also lack clarity 
Of all the insolvency procedures based on IA 1986, the IPO suffers from its most 
pronounced problems in relation to winding up, to the extent that its provisions 
are largely unusable and thus unable to effectively ‘protect the salvage’. Thus, 
any improvements in efficiency or fairness which it might potentially provide are 
unlikely to materialise. Complications start with the provision of four routes to 
partnership winding up by the court under the IPO, according to whether the 
petition is presented by the partners or the creditors, and whether concurrent 
petitions are also presented against the partners. These complications are then 
exacerbated because each route is governed by a different IPO Article which, 
misleadingly, purports to identify which sections of IA 1986 apply to the particular 
route, and whether these are modified, but does not actually do so.  In fact, 
these Articles must be consulted in tandem with s221 of IA 1986 as modified by 
and contained in the applicable IPO Schedule, since s221 identifies further IA 
1986 provisions which are applied or excluded - not always consistently with what 
appears in the relevant Article.  To further complicate the legislative structure, as 
the court noted in Official Receiver v Hollens112 quoted above, while a different 
Schedule applies to each of the winding up procedures, some of the modified 
provisions contained in the Schedules applicable to creditors’ petitions are also 
applied to partners’ petitions. The result is that the task merely of identifying the 
relevant provisions in any winding up scenario is unduly difficult and time 
consuming.  
 
This complicated legislative structure causes complications in the substantive law. 
For example, the IPO applies to partners’ petitions certain modified provisions113 
in Schs 3 and 4 on creditors’ petitions, which conflicts with the statements in 
most of those provisions that they apply to petitions under Art 7 or Art 8 - i.e. 
creditors’ petitions. The unfortunate result is that it is not entirely clear which is 
intended to prevail. If the modified sections do not apply to partners’ petitions, 
then either no versions of these sections apply, with the result that there are no 
provisions on a number of important issues such as the functions of the official 
receiver, or the unmodified IA 1986 sections must apply despite not providing for 
the concurrent petitions procedure.114  The better interpretation, which supported 
by the current editor of Lindley & Banks,115 is that the modified sections do apply 
to partners’ petitions, even where they are stated only to apply to creditors’ 
petitions. Certainly, this is the only interpretation which enables the relevant 
provisions to apply in a way which is adapted to partnership procedures.  
Legislative clarification is, however, needed in order to enable partners, creditors 
and IPs to comply with the appropriate provisions. 
                                                        
110 The court may annul a joint bankruptcy order if it appears that the order ought not to have been 
made, or that the bankruptcy debts and expenses have been paid or secured, or if a criminal 
bankruptcy order has been made against a partner (IA 1986, s 282 applied by the IPO, art 11). 
111 IA 1986, so 261 and 263D.  
112 n6.   
113 IA 1986, s 221 as modified by the IPO Sch 5, para 2/Sch 6, para 4.   
114 Berry and Parry n10 para 6.4.   
115 Lindley & Banks n7 at paras 27-67 footnote 311 and 27-68 footnote 330. 
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A second substantive problem is that although any partner may petition for the 
winding up of a partnership with concurrent petitions against the partners,116 
leave of the court is required for a petition without concurrent petitions if the 
partnership consists of less than eight partners.117 This is arbitrary and 
unnecessarily restrictive; regardless of the number of partners, any one of them 
should be able to petition without applying for leave of the court to do so, as LLP 
members can.118  If there is a rationale for requiring leave in these particular 
circumstances – and it is not clear what this rationale would be – then at least 
the partners should be permitted to agree in advance that a particular majority 
(or all) of them may petition without obtaining leave. This would be consistent 
with the right of any partner (in the absence of contrary agreement) to dissolve 
and wind up the partnership under the Partnership Act.119 A further problem in 
relation to leave is that it may apparently only be granted by the court if the 
partner has served on the partnership a written demand relating to a joint debt 
paid by the partner, has not been reimbursed, and has obtained judgment 
against the partnership and taken steps to enforce it.120  The use of the word 
‘and’ must be a mistake, the correct word being ‘or’121 and thus it being sufficient 
if the partner has either an unpaid demand or an unsatisfied judgment, which is 
the position in the underlying IA 1986 provisions for an unregistered company.122 
However, pending legislative or judicial clarification, a partner cannot be certain 
when and how he can petition.   
 
Another substantive problem is that a partnership is deemed unable to pay its 
debts,123 which is one of the grounds for a petition for the winding up of a 
partnership if execution issued on a judgment against any ‘person authorised to 
be sued as nominal defendant on behalf of the company’ is returned 
unsatisfied.124 However, it is not clear whether and how the concept of a such a 
person can apply to a partnership, since it has no intervening separate legal 
personality and is required by the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 to be sued in its 
own name unless it has no name or it is ‘inappropriate’ to use it.125  
 
There are also a number of omissions from the winding up provisions which 
significantly reduce its clarity and usability, such as the IPO’s failure to set out 
the priorities for the distribution of assets where the partnership is wound up 
without concurrent petitions.126 Although the priorities can be established, with 
some difficulty, by referring to IA 1986 and the Insolvency Rules alongside the 
IPO, this approach is hardly conducive to transparency and accessibility. 
Similarly, the government’s new approach to insolvency forms, which is to set out 
the required content in the Insolvency Rules rather than prescribing a statutory 
form (although templates for certain forms are provided), casts doubt on whether 
those forms set out in the IPO remain valid, and yet fails to address the absence 
                                                        
116 IA 1986, s 221A(1) as inserted by the IPO, Sch 5, para 2 and so 124, 264 and 272 as modified by 
the IPO, Sch 6, para 2.   
117 IA 1986, s 221A(1) and (2), as inserted by the IPO, Sch 5, para 2.  
118 Even company shareholders can petition without leave if a special resolution has been passed (IA 
1986, s 122(a)).   
119 Partnership Act, ss 26 and 32. 
120 IA 1986, s 221A(2), as inserted by the IPO, Sch 5, para 2.  
121 Blackett-Ord and Haren n8 para 22.56.  
122 IA 1986, so 222-224.   
123 IA 1986, s 221(7) as modified by the IPO, Sch 3, Pt I, para 3/Sch 5, para 2 and IA 1986 s 221(8) 
as modified  by the IPO, Sch 4 Pt I, para 3/Sch 6, para 4.   
124 IA 1986, s 224(1)(a) applied without modification by s 221(5) IA 1986 as modified by the IPO, Sch 
3, Pt I, para 3/Sch 5, para 2). IA 1986, s 224 is not applied to winding up with concurrent petitions 
(IPO, art 8(1) and art 10(1).   
125 SI 1998/3132, PD 7A, paras 5A.1–5A.3; see also Berry and Parry n10 para 6.5.4.   
126 Deards [Berry] n51.   
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of dedicated forms for a petition against a partnership without concurrent 
petitions (with the exception of a petition presented by a responsible IP)127 or for 
a petition against an LLP. This is because neither the required content nor 
templates have been provided for either partnerships or LLPs. The IPO provides 
that ‘[t]he forms shall be used with such variations, if any, as the circumstances 
may require’,128 but Forms 5 and Form 11 expressly state that they are for 
petitions against the partnership ‘presented in conjunction with petitions against 
members’ and include a section for specifying the partners against whom 
petitions are being presented, so considerable ‘variations’ are required. The 
Insolvency Service Guidance suggests that both partnerships and LLPs can be 
wound up in the same way as a company, and in both cases the links in the 
Guidance are to the company winding up form (Comp 1); the only 
acknowledgement that adaptions are required is the statement that applicants to 
wind up a partnership will need the to ask the court to wind it up as an 
unregistered company.129 However, use of Comp 1 would require even greater 
‘variation’ for partnerships;, it omits the geographic eligibility criteria specified in 
the IPO, does not include the correct grounds for a petition against a partnership, 
and refers to the date of incorporation and the registered office, which 
partnerships do not have, and to share capital, which neither partnerships nor 
LLPs have.  Even where the required deletion is obvious, the replacement text is 
not. For example, the reference to the passing of a special resolution to wind up 
the company needs to be deleted but, as discussed above, it is not clear what 
decisionmaking procedure should be substituted.  Given that a new form was 
introduced in 2017, it is surprising that it was still not made easily adaptable for 
partnerships and LLPs or indeed that separate forms were not provided. The 
courts have previously held that the use of an incorrect form will invalidate the 
proceedings even where the correct form is difficult, if not impossible, to 
identify,130 and although this approach may be relaxed in the light of the new 
policy on forms, it remains imperative that either the IPO and the LLP Regulations 
are amended to set out the content of the forms or dedicated templates are 
provided.  
 
5 Problems with disqualification 
Consistently with the aims set out in the Cork Report,131 CDDA 1986 was 
originally designed to disqualify company directors from managing another 
company where their behaviour indicated unfitness to do so. It was not designed 
to disqualify partners or LLP members, or to disqualify anyone from managing an 
LLP and, unsurprisingly, a number of problems arise from the attempt to extend 
its scope through the IPO and the LLP Regulations.   
 
The first problem is to identify when the power to disqualify a partner arises.  
Although Art 16 IPO provides that CDDA 1986 applies where a partnership is 
‘wound up as an unregistered company under Part V’, the modified version of s6 
CDDA 1986,132 which enables ‘the court’ to disqualify an officer of an ‘insolvent’ 
partnership on grounds of unfitness, provides that a partnership becomes 
‘insolvent’ not only if it is wound up but also if it enters administration, and 
accordingly defines ‘the court’ not only as that in which the partnership is being 
or has been wound up but also, where an administrator has been appointed, as 
any court which has jurisdiction to wind it up.  As the court in Re Carewatch 
                                                        
127 IA 1986, s 221A, as modified by the IPO, Sch 3, Pt I, para 3 specifies Form 3 in Sch 9.   
128 IPO, Art 17(2).   
129 Insolvency Service, ‘Guidance: How to wind up an insolvent partnership’ 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/how-to-wind-up-an-insolvent-partnership/how-to-
wind-up-an-insolvent-partnership> accessed 5 March 2018.  
130 Kaupthing Capital Partners II Master LP Inc [2010] EWHC 836 (Ch), [2011] BCC 338.  
131 n3 para 198.   
132 IPO, Sch 8.   
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(North Yorkshire and East Riding of Yorkshire) and Re CDDA 1986 1986, 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Hamilton and another noted, either 
Art 16 or s6 must contain a drafting error. 133  The court held that the mistake lay 
in the unduly narrow choice of words in Art 16, and that the relevant parts of s6 
should be ignored only if there were strong indications to this effect, which there 
were not. Furthermore, the purpose of the IPO was to apply the equivalent of the 
statutory regimes for companies, and that was not restricted to directors whose 
companies had gone into liquidation. The court concluded that fairness and 
coherence in the law required that partners be subject to the same sanctions as 
directors, regardless of whether insolvency was established through winding up or 
administration. Support for this approach may also be derived from the modified 
s8, which enables the court to disqualify an officer of an insolvent partnership on 
the grounds of expediency in the public interest but does not require the 
partnership to have been wound up.  However, given that Carewatch is an 
unreported first instance decision, this is scarcely enough to make the position 
clear. 
 
The next problem is to determine what a disqualified partner or LLP member, or 
indeed director, is disqualified from doing, since s1 CDDA 1986 provides for 
disqualification only as a company director and is applied to both partnerships 
and LLPs without modification. An LLP member who is disqualified under the 
CDDA 1986 as modified by the LLP Regulations can clearly also be disqualified 
from being an LLP member, because the LLP Regulations provide that references 
to a director include references to an LLP member. However, the Insolvency 
Service has gone further by stating that all disqualified persons, not just LLP 
members, are disqualified from acting as LLP members.134 This accords with the 
aim of the CDDA 1986 to protect the public against the abuse of limited liability, 
and the more general aim of insolvency law to ascertain the causes of insolvency 
and impose sanctions the insolvent or its officers where this is merited. It 
therefore seems unlikely that a court would uphold a challenge by a director or 
partner to an order prohibiting him from acting as an LLP member. Nonetheless, 
it has been compellingly argued that only LLP members can be disqualified from 
acting as such,135 because the LLP Regulations136 do not modify CDDA 1986 itself, 
and interpreting the unmodified s1 as including acting as an LLP member when it 
clearly does not and when this would be to the detriment of the disqualified 
person would contravene the principles of legal certainty and legitimate 
expectation. Legislative clarification of s1 CDDA 1986 and both the IPO and the 
LLP Regulations on this point is therefore urgently required.  
 
A similar question arises in relation to the possibility of disqualification from being 
a partner, because the IPO provides that references to a director are to be 
construed as including references to a partner. However, the courts have taken 
the view that disqualification from being a partner is not possible because 
disqualification is only ‘from using limited liability as one of the tools of their 
trade’.137  In Re Verby Print for Advertising Ltd the court noted that a 
disqualification order did not prevent a person from carrying on business but only 
of doing so with the privilege of limited liability, and he could therefore still trade 
                                                        
133 (Unreported), 3 May 2005, Leeds County Court. 
134 Insolvency Service, Effects of a Disqualification Order (October 2015) p3 
<www.gov.uk/government/publications/corporate-insolvency-effect-of-a-disqualification-order> 
accessed 5 March 2018.  On this basis, the sanction for acting while disqualified, personal liability for 
the debts of the company (CDDA 1986, s 15), would presumably apply similarly to the debts of an 
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135 Whittaker and Machell n68 para 37.2.  
136 LLP Regulations, Reg 4(2) and Sch 2.  
137 Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Ettinger, Re Swift 736 Ltd [1993] BCC 312 (CA) 315 
(Nicholls V-C).  See further Berry and Parry n10 para 10.8.1.  
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in partnership,138 while in Re Westminster Property Management Ltd (No 2) the 
court considered that the Court of Appeal in Secretary of State for Trade & 
Industry v Collins, Re TLL Realisations Ltd139 had endorsed the position that 
disqualification did not prevent a person carrying on business as a partner.140 
Indeed, the sanction for breach of a disqualification order - personal liability for 
the debts of the business - would not impose a detriment on a partner given that 
he would be personally liable in any event.  Accordingly, the Insolvency Service 
Guidance states explicitly that a disqualified person is not disqualified from 
carrying on business as a partner.141 Further, the modified version of s6 CDDA 
1986 in the IPO142 only refers to unfitness ‘to be concerned in the management of 
a company’. Finally, disqualification as a partner would be difficult to enforce 
given that there is no register of partnerships and that they can even be formed 
without the partners being aware of this. 
 
6 Alternatives to the IPO and the LLP Regulations 
The defects in the legislation, and the problems to which these gives rise, mean 
that the IPO and, to a lesser extent, the LLP Regulations, fail to protect creditors, 
firms, partners or LLP members, or other stakeholders, either by diminishing the 
number of businesses wrecked in the first place, or by protecting the subsequent 
salvage. This evident unfitness for purpose means that, as outlined above, there 
is a strong case for comprehensive reform of the IPO and the LLP Regulations.  
However, given that the government proposed the reform of the IPO as long ago 
as 2005143 and nothing has come of this, and that the LLP Regulations have been 
amended constantly throughout their relatively short life without the insolvency 
issues identified above being addressed, more radical alternatives to the 
piecemeal reform of the existing legislation must now be considered.   
 
a) Standalone insolvency statutes for partnerships and LLPs 
One option is to replace the IPO and the LLP Regulations with self-contained 
insolvency statutes for partnerships and LLPs. Setting out all the relevant 
provisions in full in one piece of legislation would lead to greater clarity and thus 
efficiency, by saving partners, LLP members, and creditors, time and money. 
Further, it would reduce the likelihood of the legislation failing to address areas of 
difference between partnerships and LLPs as compared to companies or 
individuals. Finally, the act of drafting and enacting separate but parallel 
insolvency regimes for partnerships and LLPs could raise their profile so that they 
are not forgotten when future amendments to company and individual insolvency 
legislation are made. The substance of the legislation could also be improved by 
allowing partners and LLP members greater discretion than IA 1986 or CDDA 
1986 would allow, to address as many issues as possible in their internal 
agreement (in particular on decisionmaking), with default provisions only in the 
absence of agreement.  The case for this is stronger for partnerships because 
they are inherently more flexible and informal vehicles than companies, and are 
not generally subject to the burden of company law at all beyond the area of 
insolvency, but there is nonetheless also a case to be made for LLPs since they 
are considerably more flexible and informal in their governance than companies. 
 
b) Integrating partnership and LLP insolvency into IA 1986 and CDDA 
1986 
                                                        
138 [1998] BCC 652 (Ch) 668.  See also Re Probe Data Systems Ltd (No 3) [1991] BCC 428 (Ch) 434 
139 [2000] BCC 998 (CA).   
140 [2001] BCC 305 (Ch) 361.   
141 Insolvency Service, Effects of a Disqualification Order n134 p4.   
142 IPO, Sch 8.  
143 Select Committee on the Merits of Statutory Instruments, 7th report (2005), App 4.   
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Some of the advantages of the option of standalone partnership and LLP statutes 
just discussed might instead be achieved by the opposite approach, of integrating 
partnership and LLP insolvency provisions into separate codified chapters within 
IA 1986 and CDDA 1986.  There is no evidence as to why this approach was not 
adopted in 1986 when the primary legislation and the Insolvent Partnerships 
Order 1986144 were enacted, or subsequently when the IPO or the LLP 
Regulations were enacted. It seems likely that it simply reflects the failure to 
appreciate the significant differences between partnerships and LLPs as compared 
to companies, as well as the failure to anticipate the difficulties which would 
result from enacting secondary legislation which is not self-contained but 
extensively cross referenced.  
 
In contrast to either of these approaches, Scottish partnerships (although not 
LLPs), which have separate legal personality, are fully integrated into personal 
insolvency law.145 However, this approach does not allow partners the degree of 
discretion recommended above, and would be much more difficult for English 
partnerships because of the very differences which have made the adaptation of 
company and individual insolvency legislation to them so difficult. 
 
c) Disapplying IA 1986 and/or CDDA 1986 
A more radical alternative to either of the above options would be simply to 
repeal the IPO and the insolvency provisions of the LLP Regulations,146 and 
thereby disapply IA 1986 and CDDA 1986 entirely. What of value would be lost? 
In relation to partnerships in particular, is it necessary to apply collective 
insolvency procedures at all? 
 
Consider, first, the rescue procedures provided by IA 1986 to facilitate the 
continuation of the business as a going concern. The aims of a ‘good modern 
insolvency law’ according to the Cork Report include providing means for the 
preservation of ‘viable commercial enterprises capable of making a useful 
contribution to the economic life of the country’147 – in other words, minimising 
the number of wrecked businesses. The contractarian and communitarian 
theories discussed above also support the availability of rescue procedures, as do 
the critiques of the creditor maximisation theory. Further, rescue procedures are 
of considerable practical utility to partners in particular, because of their personal 
liability. Of course, rescue may be achieved informally; and even in the company 
context it has been observed that this can be quicker and cheaper than formal 
procedures, and avoids the constraints imposed by the insolvency legislation.148 
Thus, since neither the Partnership Act nor the LLP legislation provides 
mechanisms to assist a firm which finds itself in temporary financial difficulties, 
beyond the application to LLPs of the provisions of the Companies Act 2006 on 
compositions and arrangements,149 it is desirable to continue to make the IA 
1986 rescue procedures available to partnerships and LLPs. Admittedly, as 
                                                        
144 SI 1986/2142.  
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discussed above, administration is not solely a rescue procedure,150 and its value 
to partners is somewhat diminished both because they (unlike LLP or company 
members) may not apply on the grounds that the partnership is likely to become 
unable to pay its debts, and because in a partnership at will any of them may 
defeat the rescue at any time by dissolving the partnership. However, these 
criticisms do not apply to LLPs and, even for partnerships, flawed rescue 
procedures are better than none. In any event, removing the rights of charge 
holders to appoint an administrator to realise their security would be likely to 
have a significant adverse impact on the availability of funding to partnerships 
and LLPs, and to be politically unacceptable.  Nonetheless, the preservation of the 
rescue procedures could be in the form of the standalone or integrated options 
discussed above, rather than the IPO and LLP Regulations. 
 
What of the protection of the salvage from an insolvency, for creditors, partners 
and LLP members, or other stakeholders? The involvement of IA 1986 through 
joint bankruptcy could be argued to be unnecessary because business debtors 
require less assistance and protection than consumer debtors (although 
admittedly sole traders can equally access bankruptcy) and because personal 
liability enables creditors to achieve wealth maximisation, and possibly their 
hypothetical bargain, without recourse to insolvency law. Further, although the 
consolidation of proceedings is consistent with the aims set out in the Cork Report 
of efficiency and preventing conflicts between creditors and ensuring that they 
receive an equitable distribution, and with the hypothetical creditors’ bargain 
theory because it prevents ad hoc recovery by creditors, there is a simpler option 
than the joint bankruptcy procedure to achieve this. The IPO amended IA 1986151 
to enable a court to consolidate proceedings where a bankruptcy petition is 
presented against any partner, although it depends on his or her partner status 
being drawn to the court’s attention. Supplementing this with a duty on parties to 
notify the court that the bankrupt is a partner would be preferable to retaining 
joint bankruptcy, because it would enable consolidation of proceedings while 
avoiding the problematic IPO provisions discussed above.  
 
It is even more difficult to defend the application of IA 1986 winding up 
procedures to partnerships. A partnership may be wound up relatively informally 
under the Partnership Act by the partners themselves152 (or by a receiver 
appointed by them153 or by the court on the application of a partner154), and 
partnership property applied in satisfaction of the firm’s debts and any surplus 
assets distributed to the partners.155 The combination of partners’ personal 
liability for partnership debts and informal proceedings under the Partnership Act 
can maximise the assets available to creditors and comply with their hypothetical 
bargain without the need for insolvency law to intervene, because informal 
winding up is likely to be considerably cheaper, quicker and easier than IA 1986 
procedures since it need not involve the court or an IP - the costs of whom can 
substantially reduce the insolvent estate to the detriment of creditors and 
partners.156 Even where a receiver is appointed, he need not be an IP and indeed 
may be a partner (although, unlike IPs under the IPO, a receiver only has 
authority to deal with the assets of the partnership, and not those of the 
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partners157).  IA 1986 procedures reduce partners’ control and thus their input 
(and that of their family) as stakeholders, and so are not supported by the 
contractarian or communitarian theories of insolvency law. Partners’ personal 
liability also means that the sanctions available under IA 1986 can neither 
incentivise nor punish them, and do not add value for creditors.  It has also been 
suggested that firms are inhibited from using the services of an ‘insolvency’ 
practitioner under the ‘insolvency’ legislation and so, if winding up is to be 
conducted at the most appropriate time to ‘increase the salvage’, the Partnership 
Act route is likely to be more effective.158 If the IA 1986 winding up procedures 
ceased to apply to partnerships, creditors would still be able to use it to bankrupt 
or wind up partners,159 which would result in the realisation and distribution of 
their share of the partnership property.  The complications caused by the IPO in 
this respect (as discussed above) would not arise, and the court would still be 
able to consolidate proceedings by virtue of the provisions of IA 1986 inserted by 
the IPO (discussed above in relation to bankruptcy proceedings against individual 
partners;160 parallel provisions apply to winding up proceedings against corporate 
partners).161 Although it might be objected that the Partnership Act winding up 
procedure fails to take into account stakeholders other than partners and 
creditors, and thus does not reflect the contractarian, communitarian or forum 
theories, the same is largely true of the IA 1986 winding up procedures since 
they similarly focus on the firm, the partners and the creditors. There is therefore 
a compelling argument for the repeal of the IPO provisions on winding up.  
 
Different considerations apply, however, to the winding up of LLPs because, 
unless LLP members have agreed to contribute to the LLP’s assets on a winding 
up, creditors can only force them to do so if the clawback162 or other sanctions in 
IA 1986 are invoked. Winding up under IA 1986 is therefore likely to maximise 
the assets available and thus promote efficiency and fairness to creditors. 
 
Finally, as to disqualification, the CDDA 1986 regime is intended to protect the 
public163 as well as shareholders, employees, and those who trade with the 
business,164 and is thus consistent with one of the primary objectives of 
insolvency law according to the Cork Report, that of investigating the conduct of 
insolvents and their officers and applying penalties if appropriate.165 It is also 
consistent with the aim stated in the 19th century166 of improving commercial 
morality. It can diminish the number of wrecked businesses by both preventing 
and deterring the abuse of the privilege of trading with limited liability167 by LLP 
members. However, partners have no limited liability to abuse and, since the 
contractarian and communitarian theories support debtor rehabilitation, there 
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should be no further sanctions on partners. The IPO provisions applying CDDA 
1986 should therefore be repealed.  
 
7 Conclusion 
The procedures applicable to insolvent partnerships under the IPO are 
fundamentally procedures for companies or individuals, and while their adaptation 
might seem a plausible approach for a business vehicle which is itself part way 
between a sole trader and a company,168 partnerships are in fact so different that 
such adaptation is inherently problematic.  Partnerships have evolved in a 
different, less regulated way to companies.  They occupy a different niche in the 
business world, allowing those who are prepared to take the risk of unlimited 
liability to operate their business with the minimum of regulation.  Increased 
regulation of the type introduced by the IPO legislation is justifiable only if that 
law is clearly drafted and has recognised merit, criteria which are much easier to 
monitor if the law is properly theorised. A multiple values approach as outlined 
above, which may be summarised as ‘protecting the salvage and diminishing the 
number of wrecks’, in principle justifies the intrusion of IA 1986 to provide rescue 
procedures, albeit that the IPO lacks clarity and is based on IA 1986 provisions 
which have been subject to criticism as noted above.169 However, the provisions 
on winding up, joint bankruptcy and disqualification are neither clear, nor of 
evident merit given the availability of clearer and simpler alternative 
mechanisms. If the IPO or a successor to it is to become a usable piece of 
legislation, it must at the very least be improved qualitatively, both in substance 
by remedying its various errors, omissions and ambiguities, and in form by 
making it much clearer exactly which provisions apply to each procedure.  This 
would ideally involve making it an entirely freestanding statute. More radically, 
the provisions of the IPO on winding up, joint bankruptcy and disqualification 
should be repealed since they are at best unnecessary and at worst harmful, 
given their expense and complexity. Partnerships can be wound up informally 
under the Partnership Act, the courts have the power to consolidate individual 
bankruptcy proceedings, and partner disqualification is simply unnecessary.  
 
The adaptation of the IA 1986 and CDDA 1986 procedures to LLPs is simpler in 
practice, since it involves applying corporate procedures to a corporate body. 
Nonetheless, those statutes are specifically aimed at companies and company 
directors, and LLPs and their members have significant differences to them - and 
indeed significant similarities to partnerships and partners - which the adaptation 
of company procedures and, by implication, company theories, has largely 
ignored. The application and modification of IA 1986 to insolvent LLPs therefore 
requires substantial improvement in both substance and form, as discussed 
above.  However, the more radical alternative of disapplying the IA 1986 winding 
up procedures and CDDA 1986 would be inappropriate for LLPs given the risk of 
the abuse of limited liability, and the consequent need to offer creditors the 
protection of formal winding up mechanisms and the disqualification of LLP 
members.  
 
                                                        
168 Steven A Frieze, ‘Action Against Partnerships’ (1995) 8 Insolv Intell 33 p35.   
169 See the sources noted at n15.  
